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ACRONYMS AND ABREVIATIONS 
 
AG - Attorney General 
AML - Anti-Money Laundering 
ASAE - Authorithy for the Food and Economy Security  
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FATF- Financial Action Task Force 
FIU - Financial Intelligence Unit 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
ISP - Instituto de Seguros de Portugal 
ML - Money Laundering 
NC - Non- compliant 
PC - Partially compliant 
PEP - Politically Exposed Person 
RNPC - National Register of Legal Persons 
SRO - Self- Regulatory Organizations 
STRs - Suspicious Transactions Reported 
TF - Terrorism Financing 











The Portuguese AML System and its Evolution 
 
Margarida Matos, Universidade Católica Portuguesa 
 
This study explores the aspects beyond the Portuguese AML system/framework, 
trying to provide an overview about this subject, being also analyzed the compliance 
with the FATF recommendations (since 2006 to 2010). 
In order to study the evolution of the several countermeasures adopted by the 
Portuguese competent authorities, with the aim to culminate recommendations in 
which Portugal was considered NC in 2006, a descriptive study was conducted.  
After a carefully literature review, in which the most important aspects concerning the 
Money Laundering thematic were addressed, a number of reports from credible 
institutions in the field of ML prevention and fight were analyzed (namely the ones 
from the FATF and UIF). After that the measures adopted were discussed with the 
objective to know if they were enough or not and in the last case what can be done in 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of Money Laundering is normally described as a process that is used to 
disguise and hide the true origin of criminal proceeds. This crime involves several 
stages (placement, layering and integration) and it to occur doesn’t require actual 
money, it happens whenever a transaction involving an illegal property/benefit (that 
can be tangible or not) takes place (Hopton, 2009). 
 
Due to globalization is easier to launder the criminal procedures, because it is simpler 
to integrate it in the legitimate economy (Vitor Tanzi, 1994) and due to the 
technological advances, transferring money from one place to another is relatively 
simple, so in order to combat and prevent this crime an effective, efficient and 
coordinate AML system (the international collaboration is also extremely important) 
is crucial in order to avoid and minimize possible devastating consequences that arise 
from the association with ML. 
 
There are several entities that join forces with the objective to fight ML activities, 
being the FATF one of the most important. This entity launches a series of 
recommendations, intending to be a set of the best practices in order to give an 
appropriate answer to ML.  
 
 
1.1 Research Topic 
 
This dissertation project has as main objective to explore the Portuguese AML system 
analyzing its compliance with the FATF recommendations (from 2006 to 2010) and to 
achieve this objective a descriptive study was conducted (recurring to reports from 
credible institutions, such as the FATF and UIF, which ones represented an important 
information source to analyze the measures adopted by the competent authorities whit 
the aim to culminate failures in several recommendations in which Portugal was 
considered NC or PC in 2006). 
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1.2 Paper Structure 
 
In what concerns the structure of this dissertation, and after a carefully literature 
review in which some of the most important and relevant points related with ML are 
mentioned and analyzed, the research questions and methodology used to study it are 
presented. Finally, is discussed if the measures adopted by Portugal are enough to 
fully respect the FATF recommendations. 
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Money Laundering Definition 
 
There are an important number of consequences that result from Money Laundering 
and every aspect involving its prevention, detection and prosecution are extremely 
relevant. Despite of the complexity related with this thematic the definition of this 
concept is quite simple. 
 
There are several definitions of Money Laundering. The majority of the countries 
apply the definition provided by two important conventions: the United Nations 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988) (Vienna Convention); The United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized crime (2000) (Palermo Convention) (this convention aimed “to promote 
cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively.”). 
In the Portuguese case the offenses related with ML represent a large range and are 
defined under the UN Vienna and Palermo conventions.   
 
 
2.1.1 Vienna Convention 
 
According to the article 2 of the Vienna Convention this convention aims to bring an 
international dimension in order to combat in a more effective way the problems 
related with illicit traffic of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Due to this 
approach is possible to establish a set of solutions for problems that normally occur in 
international cooperation (namely the ones relating the characteristic slowness 
associated with this type of burocratic procedure and it also avoids possible 
cooperation refusals that may occur). Due to the international mandatory confiscation 
assistance, defined in this convention, is possible to address problems that result from 
the fact that sometimes drug traffickers invest their illicit funds in other countries that 
are not their origin country where they commit these activities. 
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2.1.2 Palermo Convention 
 
In the Palermo Convention, Money Laundering, criminal association, obstruction of 
justice and corruption constitute four offenses that need to be included in the States 
domestic law. Regarding the definition of Money Laundering this one is given in 
Article 6 of the convention and is defined as “The conversion or transfer of property, 
knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in 
the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her 
action”. Another important aspect that is defined in this convention is related with the 
measures to combat Money Laundering, which includes the reporting of suspicious 
transactions, customer identification and record keeping.  
 
• Money Laundering has as main objective concealing or disguising the origin 
of certain types of property that are obtain trough an illicit act (drug 
trafficking) and at the same time hide the identity of the persons that 
participate in this type of offense. 
 
• Every act that tries to conceal/disguise the “true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property “ 
(Schott, 2006) when the person involved is aware of the property’s illegal 
origin. 
 
• According to the Vienna and Palermo Conventions Money Laundering is 
related with “ the acquisition, possession or use of property” when the 
elements involved have prior knowledge about the true nature of the property 
in question that results from an offense(s) or from the participation in it. 
 
Unfortunately Money Laundering occurs all over the world. However, the more 
attractive countries/sectors are the ones where the legislation and programmes (AML 
and CFT infrastructures) regarding this thematic are not so effective and where 
consequently the risk of detection is lower.  
 
2.1.3 Portuguese Penal Code 
 12 
 
In the Portuguese Law Money Laundering is punished under the Article 368ª - A of 
the Portuguese Penal Code. According to this article funds are a result from activities 
related to pimping, sexual abuse of children or dependent minors, extortion, 
trafficking narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, arms trafficking, trafficking 
human organs or tissues, protected species trafficking, tax fraud, influence peddling 
and corruption. Anyone that tries to dissimulate the illegal origin of the funds is 
punish by law as well as anyone that tries to conceal or disguise the true nature, 
source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of the illicit funds. The 
sanctions applied are valid even if the facts underlying the crime don’t occur in 
Portuguese National Territory or even if the place where these occurred is unknown. 
 
 
2.2 Money Laundering Cycle 
 
Regarding the processes involved in Money Laundering there are three main phases: 
placement; layering; integration. Independently of the type of crime Money 
Launderers resort to the phases mentioned before in order to integrate funds from 
illegal activities into the financial system.  It is extremely difficult to estimate the 
amount of money involved in this laundry cycle and since the integration in the 
international banking system is getting deeper is more difficult to discover it’s origin1. 
Concerning the different stages of the process, they may occur in different countries, 
because this type of complex international financial transactions facilitates the 
activities related with Money Laundering schemes2. 




















In this initial stage the illegal funds are introduced in the financial system by the 
launderer and normally this is done trough a financial institution. This can be done in 
several ways: one of the most common techniques is the division of a large amount of 
cash into smaller amounts and then making several deposits in a bank account (in a 
single financial institution or in several ones) or another type of dissimulation is done 
trough the purchase of checks (or another kind of monetary instruments like money 
orders for instance) that are deposited in different locations3. The purchase of a 
security or a form of an insurance contract is another way of acting in this initial stage 
of the process. Tony (2000) considered that due to the increasing law enforcement, in 
which concerns the report that banks need to made about suspicious transactions, this 
stage of Money Laundering cycle is getting more risky. 
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After the stage mentioned before (in which the funds are introduce in the system) the 
layering phase begins. Now the launderer’s main objective is to create the illusion that 
the funds have a legal origin. In order to accomplish this task the launderer can 
distribute the money in several accounts around the world (subject to different 
jurisdictions) or in a more complex scheme it’s also possible to apply the same funds 
in the purchase/sale of investment instruments (securities, insurance contracts that can 
be sold recurring to another financial institution). The use of a wide range of accounts 
(is in this phase that is normal to recur to offshore mechanisms) in order to launder 
money is more common in those countries that don’t cooperate in anti-Money 
Laundering investigations/policies4. 
 
Different types of negotiable instruments are used to incorporate these illegal funds 
which ones can be, as mentioned above, transferred to several accounts in different 





In this last phase the funds are generally invested in different types of business that 
may vary between “real estate, luxury assets or business ventures (shares in 
companies)” 5 and due to this they become part of the legitimate economy. Usually 
entities like casinos, hotels and restaurants are targets for this type of investment, 
because in this kind of businesses dirty money can be easily laundered (Tony, 2000). 
 
The ML phases described above take place in different parts of the world. The first 
stage of the process, generally takes place in the fund’s place of origin and an activity 
close to the underlying one is used to process the illegal cash. 




In the next phase (layering) it’s necessary to opt for a financial or business 
infrastructure. So, a choice must be done between “an offshore financial centre, a 
large regional business centre, or a world banking centre” 6. 
 
At the integration stage, if the funds are originated from an unstable economy in 
which the investment opportunities are few they are later transferred and invested in a 
more attractive country. 
 
 
2.3 The Impact of Financial Crime in Organizations 
 
Reputational risk - The reputation of an institution can be easily damaged and lose 
its credibility if their business practices are inappropriate and this fact can have a 
negative impact in the confidence of their clients, creditors and the market place as a 
whole. This type of risk is especially propitious to occur in banks due to the nature of 
their business, which is considered as one of the principal vehicles used by their 
customers for criminal activities7. 
 
Operational risk - As occurs with the reputational risk this one can also have an 
impact in the business of the bank and remaining financial and non-financial 
institutions. An accurate management of the operational risk need to be done because 
is extremely important to have effective control procedures in order to avoid losses 
that can result from the absence of the adequate control procedure and the application 
of a non correct due diligence procedure8. 
 
Legal risk – An entity is exposed to this risk when it doesn’t respect the mandatory 
standards defined by the FATF against Money Laundering activities and as a 
consequence their operations can suffer from the costs that result from lawsuits9. 
 
 
                                                
6 Id. 
7 https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Bangladesh/Bangladesh_Guidence_Notes_on_Prevention_of_Mon 




2.4 Money Laundered per year 
 
Several efforts were made by some entities (namely the IMF and the United Nations) 
in order to provide an estimate concerning the amount of Money that is laundered. In 
1996, and according to the IMF, an attempt to answer this question fixed this amount 
in a range between $ 590 billion to $ 1,5 trillion (representing 2% - 5% of the world’s 
gross domestic product). In the recent years the UN gave an estimate between $ 500 
million to $ 1 trillion. 
 
In what concerns the demand for Money Laundering there are only few estimates, the 
Macroeconomic and the Microeconomic and the same can be seen only as indicative 
due to their limitations (the first method conduct to unrealistic high figures and the 
second one doesn’t have a solid empirical base). However these estimates are 
sufficient to prove the dimension of ML and to call the public policy attention for this 
phenomenon (Levi and Reuter, 2006). 
 
 
2.4.1 Macroeconomic Estimates 
 
In this specific case when a tax is not paid (being this one from a legal or illegal 
activity) it’s assumed that this amount will need to be laundered. There is a 
relationship between the monetary component of the underground economy and ML. 
Actually when macroeconomists, during the 1980s, tried to quantify the first one they 
were actually measuring ML, because they analysed the variations in currency 
demand linked with higher taxes and consequently tax evasion (Quirk, 1997). 
 
Schneider and Enste (2000) provide a comparison between the sizes of the 
underground economy in relation to the GDP in different countries (developing, 
transaction and OECD), recurring for this purpose to a currency demand approach. 
According to these authors, and using this type of methodology, the underground 
economy in OECD countries represents a significant percentage of their economy (for 
example, and assuming the period between 1990-93, the underground economy in 
Portugal represented 24% - 30% the GDP). Concerning the size of the underground 
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economy their magnitude is smaller in countries with relatively few public sectors and 
with a strong tax moral (like the US and Switzerland). In this study, this figure 
represents more than 10% of global GDP, which is contradictory and substantially 
bigger than the percentage presented by the IMF (2% - 5%) that is taken as the most 
correct one. 
 
Blades and Roberts (2002) criticize this macroeconomic approach presented by 
Schneider and Enste (2000), which one conducted to high estimations. From their 
point of view the main question is related with the fact that this non-observed 
economy is mainly concentrated in few sectors that are considered the “susceptible” 
ones (home repairs, retail trade, taxis, trucking, cafes and restaurants) while in others 
(power generation, heavy industry, rail and air transport, government services, 
banking and telecommunications) due to the inexistence of incentives to hide and 
don’t report revenues, the “shadow” economy doesn’t represent a high percentage of 
the total economy. According to Blades and Roberts this conduct to some incredible 
numbers, where in the susceptible sectors the weight of the underground economy 
raises numbers close to 70% and this doesn’t seems plausible. 
 
 
2.4.2 Microeconomic Estimates 
 
This approach can be considered as a complement to the previous one, that doesn´t 
give attention to the estimation to the total earnings from criminal activities that go 
beyond tax evasion (Reuter and Truman, 2004). The microeconomic estimative are 
build according to different crime categories and is “based on street knowledge; 
sampling; and detailed medical, social, and financial/tax records” (Quirk, 1997). 
 
In order to proceed to a microeconomic estimative there are two different stages. In 
the first one is made an estimative concerning the earnings generated by a specific 
crime (for example, tax evasion or drug dealing). After that, and recurring to 




Concerning the estimation of criminal earnings the known numbers are not credible. 
Blades and Roberts (2002) attempted to provide estimates, for OECD and transaction 
economies, and the numbers presented represent around 0.5% to 1.0 % of GDP. 
However, these percentages are not easily related with ML. What happens is that 
certain amounts of criminal revenues (until $25,000 annually) are used directly 
without recurring to a financial intermediary and due to this procedure it’s not 
possible to provide an accurate estimation of the amount of these earnings that will be 
subject to ML.  
 
According to Reuter and Truman (2004), the main problem associated with this 
approach is the lack of data and the fact that the existing one is not reliable. 
Despite of all the efforts made to estimate the dimension of the problem several 
authors, like Tanzi (1994), defend that due to the nature of the criminal activities that 
generate earnings, which need to be launder, it’s impossible to have a precise idea of 
the amounts of net financial gains generated. 
 
 
2.5 Money Laundering Consequences and Impacts 
 
The impacts resulting from ML are felt in the economy, security and society as a 
whole. 
 
This criminal activity carry out several costs for governments that need to make 
investments in health care (to combat the effects that result from drug trafficking, a 
major issue in what concerns predicate offenses) and also need to go through with law 
enforcement procedures10. 
 
Due to the impact that Money Laundering has in the macroeconomic environment is 
crucial to implement and improve measures in order to fight this problem. 
 
                                                
10 https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Bangladesh/Bangladesh_Guidence_Notes_on_Prevention_of_Money_Laund 
    ering.pdf 
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There are sets of activities that are difficult to measure due to their dimension/scale 
(Money Laundering, crime and underground activities), but it is crucial that 
policymakers be aware of their existence and take their effect in consideration. 
 
 
2.5.1 Economic Growth 
 
Quirk (1997) and McDowell (2008) defend that there are income distribution effects 
that result from ML and this effects are visible in the transference of capital that the 
criminal activity send from high savers to low savers, or from sound investments to 
risky, low quality investments and this behavior will contribute to an economic 
distortion and instability affecting the economic growth. 
 
Tanzi (1994) describes the behavior of Money Launders as contradictory, because 
these individuals move capital from countries with higher rates of return to countries 
with lower rates of return and this affects the optimal level of investments of the 
world capital (this allocation of resources contributes for the decrease of the world 
rate growth) and as a consequence of this contradictory movement a confusion 
regarding the policies to be pursued can occur. 
 
 
2.5.2 Contamination Effect 
 
According to Quirk (1997) a contamination effect can occur, because illegal 
transactions can affect the legal ones and this fact results in an indirect 
macroeconomic effect. A good illustration of this effect is related with the fact that 
some transactions, in which participants from other countries are involved, are seen as 
less attractive due to a possible association with Money Laundering procedures. It’s 
also important to mention that if one law is not respected is easier to break others and 
this situation can create an unstable environment. 
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2.5.3 Private Sector 
 
The private sector can be seriously affected by Money Laundering activities and some 
of the most relevant microeconomics effects are felt in this sector. 
 
McDowell (2008) justifies the serious effects felt in this sector with the existence of a 
series of front companies which have access to illicit funds and that are used by 
criminals as a way to hide their ill-gotten gains. This type of company is able to offer 
products with a lower (due to their access to the illicit funds that finance their 
products/services) price when comparing with legal firms. A negative macroeconomic 
effect results from this situation, because for a legal company is almost impossible to 
compete against a front company that doesn’t respect the free market principle. 
 
 
2.5.4 Confidence in markets (Reputation Risk) 
 
It’s also important mentioning that the confidence in markets is directed affected by 
the association to Money Laundering and financial crimes activities. This type of 
negative association to a country contributes to call the attention of criminal 
organizations and a decrease in the economic growth, global opportunities and 
development occurs (McDowell, 2008).  
 
Tanzi (1994) describes the effects of ML criminal activities in the transparency and 
soundness of financial markets, which ones can be affected immediately but it takes a 
long time to recovery. However this type of negative reputation can be avoided trough 
an effective anti-money-laundering policy and due to its correct implementation 
governments can save resources that otherwise would have to invest in the recovery 
of their financial reputation11. 
                                                
11 https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Bangladesh/Bangladesh_Guidence_Notes_on_Prevention_of_Money_Laund 
    ering.pdf 
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2.5.5 Tax evasion (Loss of Revenue) 
 
Another consequence that is driven from the practice of Money Laundering crimes is 
the loss of revenue associated with a decreasing in government’s tax revenue, which 
is translated in higher tax rates affecting honest taxpayers that will be subject to living 
higher costs (McDowell, 2008). Quirk (1997) describes tax evasion as the illegal 
activity that causes a bigger macroeconomic impact and this author also mention that 
this type of illegal activity occurs mainly in countries whose economy is growing, 




2.5.6 Emerging Economies 
 
According to McDowell (2008) financial systems in smaller economies are the ones 
mainly affected by the association of financial institutions with ML. There are 
inevitable risks that arise from that association, namely the ones related with 
monetary instability and systemic crises (which can lead to the destabilization of the 
financial system due to the low credibility and lack of confidence in the financial 
institutions). 
 
Tanzi (1994) refers that there is also an effect in the exchange and interest rates that 
result from capital movements, which one can also have an impact in the price of the 




2.5.7 Loss of control 
 
As previously mentioned it’s almost impossible to know the truly extensions of 
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Money Laundered around the world, but according to the IMF it represents a 
significant percentage of the world gross domestic product. These large amounts 
conduct to an economic policy loss of control by governments, which in some 
countries, these illicit procedures dwarf government budgets, which results in a loss of 
control of economic policy by their governments.  
 
 
2.5.8 Socio-economic effects 
 
McDowell describes several socio-economic effects that can be felt in different levels 
(market, government and citizens) due to the power transference that occurs and 
favors criminals. 
 
All society members can be corrupted by criminals that commit ML crimes, having 
huge economic power they try to bribe government elements and persons with 
important positions and this situation leads to social and political costs.  
 




2.6 United Nations (Office on Drugs and Crime) 
 
The United Nations office on drugs and crime has a unit responsible for dealing with 
AML and organized crime, which one was created with the aim to provide an 
adequate response to the Vienna convention. 
 
The Global Programme against ML has as main objective to ensure that the MS put in 
practice the right measures to fight ML and TF and help in the detection, seizing and 
confiscation of criminal proceeds trough the necessary and adequate technical 
assistance12. This program also creates a bigger awareness about this thematic and at 
                                                
12 http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/index.html 
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the same time stimulates the development of a framework designed to combat ML by 
the MS which ones are called to proceed with monitoring of this crime13. 
It is also responsible for the coordination of several initiatives carried out by the UN 
and other international organizations. 
 
 
2.7 FATF  
 
The Financial Action Task force was founded, in Paris, in 1989 by the G-7 Summit. 
There was a need to create this entity due to the increasing number of crimes 
involving Money Laundering practices and the need to establish a co-ordinate 
international response was a priority. In 2001, the combat to terrorist financing 
entered in the FATF scope of intervention (and at that time 9 special 
recommendations were created with the objective to prevent, detect and suppress this 
crime that was growing in the beginning of the century)14. 
 
The Financial Action Task Force works at two different levels (the national and 
international) and develops/promotes a series of policies whit the purpose to combat 
Money Laundering and terrorism financing. The FATF is an inter-governmental body 
that that is responsible for regulatory reforms in the areas mentioned before. One of 
its main tasks was the development of 40 recommendations to fight Money 
Laundering that are, at the same time, a support to national governments that need to 
implement and put in practice effective anti-Money Laundering programmes (these 
recommendations are also used by non-FATF member countries in order to address 
this problem)15. 
 
The FATF recommendations (40+9) are designated for universal application and 
define the basic framework to face this two crime typologies. There are three main 
objectives that the FATF tries to give an adequate response (Thony, 2000): 
 






• Improve national systems to combat Money Laundering - this is done trough the 
implementation of an effective confiscation procedure and also by punishing all 
the different types of Money Laundering crimes (not only the ones directly 
associated with drugs) in accordance with the Vienna Convention. 
 
• Strengthen the role of the financial system - As previously mentioned the financial 
entities need to proceed to client’s identification and also need to analyze if there 
are any suspicious transactions (this type of illegal transaction can decrease 
significantly if the financial institution implement a set of measures/techniques 
promoting secure transaction). 
 
• Strengthen international cooperation - this cooperation can be done trough the 
adoption of programs that promote a reciprocal assistance in the field of justice 
(namely concerning the confiscation of funds, extradition processes and 
investigations) and the different countries should also share information about the 
international foreign currency flows   
 
The Financial Action Task Force is comprised by 34 member jurisdictions (which 
represent the most important financial centers in the world) and 2 regional 
organizations (which results in a 36 member inter-governmental body). 
 
It’s important to mention that the FATF doesn’t work alone. A good illustration of 
this is their collaboration with some international bodies, like OECD, with the aim to 
exchange information and support the efforts made to prevent and detect crimes 
involving bribery and corruption. The IMF, the World Bank, the UN and FATF- style 
regional bodies are also important units that work closely with the FATF. 
 
 
2.8 The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units  
 
The FIUs are central bodies in the AML programs, establishing the exchange of 
information between financial institutions and law enforcement. These units are not 
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only responsible for this exchange of information in a national level but also in an 
international one due to the international nature of ML (Schott, 2006). 
 
The Egmont Group was created in 1995 and it consists in a group of FIUs that 
decided to collaborate between them recognizing the importance of co-operation, 
which contributes for their individual efficacy and support the global fight against ML 
and TF16. 
 
This group organizes meetings in which several questions are discussed namely the 
ones shared by the several members, is also provided assistance/advises to their AML 
programs and the international collaboration is also promoted. Some of the Egmont 
Group objectives include the improvement and incentive to the information exchange, 
the creation of a website in order to facilitate the communication among FIUs, 
stimulate the staff training and finally promote the developing of FIUs (these points 
constitute the so called Permanent Administrative support)17. 
 
In order to achieve its mission of development, cooperation, and sharing of expertise 
the Egmont Group create five working groups and a committee (See Annex 1)18. 
 
 
2.9 The Portuguese AML System 
 
• Law no. 25/2008 
 
In the Portuguese AML system (defined in Law no.25/2008) the financial entities 
(credit institutions, credit companies and insurance companies among others) and the 
non-financial entities (casinos and real state agencies for instance) are the obliged 
entities that are subject to the law that addresses the prevention and repression of 
Money Laundering and terrorism financing.  
 
There are several duties/obligations that the entities mentioned before have to respect. 
                                                
16 Statement of Purpose, Egmont Group. 
17 Statement of Purpose, Egmont Group. 
18 Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont Group. 
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The identification procedure needs to be done by the financial entities when the 
amount associated to the transactions is equal or greater than 15 000 €, when there is a 
doubt regarding a possible relation between the operation and a Money 
Laundering/terrorism financing crime or when the information about the client is not 
clear enough.  
 
The due diligence19 is another measure that the financial institutions need to 
implement and adopt. According to this recommendation Financial entities should 
perform customer identification and verifications of it’s identity whenever they enter 
in a business relationship with the same (being this one occasional or not), when there 
is a possible association with a ML or TF and CDD should be applicable to the 
existing customers. It’s important to perform an ongoing due diligence in order to 
guarantee that the level of risk associated with that customer’s business remains the 
same and at the same time verify that the transactions realized are under the 
parameters defined when the same began. 
 
The referred CDD procedures should be put in practice, but the risk involved in the 
different types of transactions and customers should be taken into consideration 
(enhancing due diligences for higher risk relationships and reducing due diligences 
should be applied to the ones with low risk). 
 
Regarding Record Keeping, about domestic and international transactions, these are 
recommended to be kept during a minimum period of five years in order to give an 
appropriated answer to authorities requirements. 
 
The obliged entity also needs to take in account the nature, frequency, purpose, 
complexity and singularity of the operation/activity as well as it should know the 
amount, origin and final destiny. Another obligation is related with the 
communication that the obliged entities need to do when they observed any suspicious 
transaction (being the STRs report one of the fundamental pillars in the prevention of 
ML). 
 
                                                
19 The Forty Recommendations, Rec.5 
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In order to successfully prevent and respond to this type of financial crime a series of 
procedures and internal policies need to be implemented and taken into account 
(internal control, assessment / management of risk and internal audit assessments).  
 
 
2.10 Supervision Entities 
 
2.10.1 Banco de Portugal (BdP) 
 
As previously mentioned, financial crime can have serious impacts in an organization 
(increasing the reputation, operation, finance and legal risks which can seriously 
damage a financial institution) and due to the adoption of an internal control system, 
defined by the BdP, these impacts can be minimized (due to an effective prevention 
and detection) as well as the ML/TF operations involving these institutions, can be 
avoided. 
 
Therefore, the prevention and monitoring of ML in financial institutions is BdP 
responsibility and this supervision entity has also an active role in the elaboration of 
the normative framework concerning this thematic. Finally, the Bank of Portugal is 
also responsible for the imposition of sanctions when the supervised entities don’t 
comply with the duties imposed by the AML/CTF system20 
 
 
2.10.2 Instituto de Seguros de Portugal (ISP) 
 
The ISP is a supervisory authority responsible for verifying if the insurance and 
pension fund sector is in compliance with the AML framework. If the supervised 
entities don’t respect their obligations (provide the complete information and report to 
the ISP; give all the relevant and necessary documentation requested; notify the ISP 
about entity’s shareholder structure) it’s ISP responsibility to apply the adequate 
sanction. 
                                                




Among these are the powers to: 
 
• Verify company’s activities, in a technical, financial, legal level and also fiscal 
correctness in insurance and reinsurance; 
 
• Thoroughly check other information regarding the situation of insurance 
companies and their operations as a whole, for instance through the collection of 
data, the inspection of documents related to the insurance business or inspections 
carried out on the insurer’s premises; 
 
• Adopt measures involving the insurance companies, their directors or controlling 
interests, sufficient and necessary to ensure that their operations are within the 
legal and regulatory parameters applicable to them, specifically regarding the 
their activities programmes, and also to avoid or eliminate any irregularity that 
could jeopardize the interests of policyholders and beneficiaries21. 
 
 
2.10.3 Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) 
 
CMVM is a supervision entity that is responsible for some regulations concerning 
AML provisions (this ones related with ML prevention in securities operations and 
customer record keeping) that are binding to financial intermediaries in the securities 
market and these entities have to provide all the information and documentation 
requested by the CMVM. 
 
There are several entities in the securities market (public bids, settlement systems, 
centralised securities) that are subject to CMVM supervision and monitoring, 
regarding their compliance with AML legislation, and the same happens with the 
financial intermediary system. Beyond it’s regulatory and supervision role, CMVM 
also reports to the AG operations potentially related with ML activities, linked with 
securities management companies. 
 
                                                
21 http://www.isp.pt 
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Financial entities that are listed in the stock exchange have the obligation to notify the 
CMVM about suspicious transactions that need to be inspected by the last one22. 
 
 




ASAE is the national administrative authority specialized in the economic and food 
supervision being responsible for carrying out inspections related with the food and 
non-food sectors, analyzing its risks, verifying if the sectors mentioned before respect 
the law and communicating any anomaly or risk detected.23 
 
This national authority is also responsible, since 1 January 2006, for verifying the 
compliance with the ML obligations of several businesses: real estate business and 
the purchase and sale of properties, to dealers in goods of high unit value, companies 
providing money transport services and companies operating on behalf of a client 
performing the operations in Article 20 f) of Law 11/2004.24 
 
2.11.2 Inspecção Geral de Jogos 
 
The IGJ (Inspecção Geral de Jogos) is the entity responsible for the supervision of all 
the activities related with gambling. 
 
In the field of the ML prevention IGJ verifies if the entities in question (like for 




                                                
22 FATF- Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Terrorism 
Financing, Portugal 2006 
23 http://www.asae.pt/ 
24 FATF- Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Terrorism  
Financing, Portugal 2006 
25 Id 
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2.12 Unidade de Informação Financeira (UIF) 
 
The Financial Intelligence Unit, shortly designated by the acronym FIU is the national 
entity responsible for collecting, centralizing, processing, analyzing and disseminating 
information concerning the prevention and investigation of crimes of laundering, 
terrorist financing and tax crimes at a national level, ensuring the internal cooperation 
and coordination with the judicial and supervision authorities and with the financial 
and non financial entities (according to the Law No. 25/2008 of June 5). At an 
international level the cooperation and exchange information, with financial 
intelligence units or similar structures (respecting the conditions set in it’s domestic 
law), is in the UIF scope of intervention26. 
 
In the field of their legal competences, defined in the Law No. 25/2008 of June 5, the 
diffusion of information about trends in order to prevent Money Laundering and 
terrorism financing is their responsibility. 
 
The UIF also needs to provide an exchange of information about the suspicious 
activities concerning ML and TF that the obliged entities and the supervision 
authorities communicated27 (See Annex 2). 
 
The statistical data, preparation and update, about this thematic (suspicious 
transactions reported) is also UIF´s responsibility that should report to the Direcção-
Geral da Política de Justiça28. 
 
 
2.13 Departamento Central de Investigação e Acção Penal (DCIAP) 
 
DCIAP´s main responsibility is the investigation’s direction and coordination, as well 
as the prevention and fight against violent crimes associated with a high complex and 
organized criminality. In order to pursuit their objectives this entity acts in two 
distinct areas: criminal prevention, direction of criminal investigations that have a 
                                                
26 http://www.pj.pt/PortalWeb/page/%7BE6E29429-8228-44A5-8338-9A3F3BCC3986%7D 
27 Law No. 25/2008, article 43 
28 Law No. 25/2008, article 44 (2) 
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territorial spread and coordination of the investigation’s direction at a national level 
(which contribute to a distribution of the coordination hierarchical power)29. 
 
Money Laundering is, among other crimes (for instance terrorism, drug trafficking 
and corruption), one of the illegal activities which DCIAP´s have the coordination of 
its investigation30. 
 
In order to have more efficient, simple and rational procedures the articulation 
between DCIAP and the other departments/services (namely the criminal policy) is 
crucial. It’s also DCIAP responsibility the elaboration of studies concerning the 
trends, nature and volume of criminality as well as the results of the efforts made in 
prevention, detection and control. 
 
Regarding the criminal prevention there are sets of crimes that belong to the DCIAP 
scope of intervention and Money Laundering is included. Is this department 
responsibility to receive and analyze all the communications (provided by the obliged 
entities and the UIF) regarding suspicious transactions that can be associated with 
Money Laundering / terrorism financing and to suspend the suspicious operation if 
necessary (notifying the obliged entity for that). 
 
 
2.14 Research Questions 
 
Trough the analysis of the literature review it was clear the extreme importance of an 
adequate AML system in the successfully prevention and combat to ML, which one 
can bring enormous costs to the entire society. 
 
Therefore, and having the Portuguese AML system as case study, various aspects 
concerning its system were analyzed not forgetting the important contribution of the 
Law no.25/2008. 
                                                
29 http://www.pgr.pt/grupo_pgr/Dciap/apresentacao.html 
30 Directive no.2005/60/CE and 2006/70/CE 
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The diagram bellow indicates the Research questions explored as well as the structure 























Fig. 2. Research Questions.
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In order to analyze the level of compliance of Portugal and the efficiency of its AML 
system a descriptive study, based on several reports, was conducted. 
 
The principal source of information was the FATF Mutual Evaluation of Portugal (in 
which the level of compliance with the 40 recommendations is discussed). The reason 
for chosen this source is mainly related with the credibility that the same has in the 
international community, that sees in the FATF a solid organization in the fight 
against ML with well defined standards and methodologies. 
 
The recommendations analyzed were only the ones that presented a NC or PC rating 
with the final aim of understanding if Portugal was able to answer to the FATF 
standards (studying for that purpose the various measures adopted, provided in the 
update report of 2008 and 2010). 
 
During this study and whenever it was possible the FATF reports were confronted 
with reports provided by the UIF and with studies conducted by KPMG in the field of 
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Source: FATF- Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the 
Terrorism Financing, Portugal 2006 
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IV. COMPLIANCE LEVEL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
 
4.1 Customer Due Diligence and Record Keeping   
(Recommendation 6 & Recommendation 7) 
 
Recommendation 6 (2006) 
 
According to the recommendation 6 of the FATF (FATF 40 recommendation), 
financial institutions should have special attention and put in practice some special 
measures (in addition to the normal due diligence procedure) when they are dealing 
with politically exposed persons (PEP). In order to fully respect this recommendation 
the financial institution should have an efficient risk management system that allows a 
proper PEP´s identification31 (PEP’s are persons who hold or have held, twelve 
months before of the date of the transaction, public or political functions, in spite of 
the place of residence, and that their immediate family members or known persons, to 
be closed associates through a business or commercial relationship. The definition of 
PEP’s can be found in the Article 2 (6) of Law no. 25/2008); it needs to have an 
approval in order to initiate a business relationship with this type of client; the 
financial institution also needs to know the source of the funds and finally this 
business relationship needs to be subject of a constant monitoring. 
 
Concerning the Portuguese case the FATF considered that this recommendation is 
non-compliant (NC)32. However is important to mention that at that time the Directive 
2005/60/EC (on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of 
ML and TF) was not transposed to the Portuguese law and some aspects concerning 
the PEP´s will only be completely respected with the transpositions of this directive.  
 
One of the aspects that conducted to this evaluation is, according to the FATF, the 
                                                
31 According to a KPMG/UIF study (2008), concerning the AML system in Portugal, there are  
significant differences in the PEP concept (which one varies across different countries). However this 
can be overcome if a more generic definition is adopted, based in a risk approach evaluation, which 
contributes to a higher consistence.  
32 FATF- Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Terrorism  
Financing, Portugal 2006 
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confusion concerning what are the national and the international PEP´s which are not 
differentiated in the Portuguese law (for instance the distinction is not taken into 
account in the lists of suspicious activities referred in the BdP Instruction 26/2005). 
 
According to the Bdp and ISP, a customer’s risk profile should be defined and if there 
is a higher risk of ML, an additional diligence should be conducted. However, the 
FATF recommendation is not fully respected because a supplementary CDD is not 
performed, when the financial institution is dealing with a PEP, and the senior 
management approval is not required by law. 
 
Recommendation 6 (2008) 
 
The Law no. 25/2008 (AML/CTF Law) introduced in the Portuguese legal framework 
some important measures that contributed to a more complete compliance with some 
of the FATF´s recommendations. Due to the introduction of this law there was a 
reinforcement of the PEP´s due diligence requirements and the definition is clearer. 
 
The reinforcement of the due diligence 33, provided by this law, includes the four 
main points mentioned by the FATF in recommendation 6 and also establishes an 
enforcement of the due diligence duty in operations involving non-resident PEPs.  
In order to define the risk profile of their clients, the financial institutions need to 
gather information about them like required by the supervision authorities (BdP, 
CMVM and the ISP). 
 
In conclusion, and according to the Portuguese authorities, the present AML/CTF law 
fully addresses the FATF recommendation 6 and is clear the important contribution of  




 2006 2008 
                                                
33 The due dilligence is crucial in order to obtain precise information about the counterpart that is  
considered a high risk client (due to the reputational question that can arise from the establishment of 
this type of relation ) (KPMG, 2008). 
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Recommendation 6 
Politically exposed persons 
NC C 
 
Recommendation 7 (2006)  
 
According to the FATF, recommendation 7 is Partially Compliant (PC). 
 
In this recommendation the FATF suggests that financial institutions should have 
sufficient and relevant information about the cross-border correspondent banking. The 
Portuguese AML/CTF is not totally compliance with that, because what is defined in 
the BdP instruction 26/2005 as mandatory is only the obligation to “enhanced due 
diligence and take precautionary measures against the risk of being involved in ML, 
whenever such relationships are with institutions from countries which are not EU 
member states or FATF members”, which according to the FATF should be valid to 
all respondent institutions whether or not it is an EU or FATF member.  
 
Another aspect that is not in compliance with this recommendation is the fact that the 
Portuguese law does not provide the obligation regarding the need for senior 
management approval before the establishment of a new relationship. 
 
There is no regulation regarding to the payable-through accounts34 that satisfies the 
conditions established by Recommendation 7. This Recommendation can be satisfied 
when the correspondent bank is able to provide relevant customer identification data 
upon request, which verifies the identity of the customers having direct access to 
accounts and assures the performed on-going due diligence on these accounts.  
 
 Recommendation 7 (2008) 
 
In the law no. 25/ 2008 (Article 26) the due diligence duty is reinforced and because 
of the new obligations, defined in the previous law, the Portuguese Authorities are 
now in compliance with Recommendation 7 (concerning the quality and amount of 
information collected, the necessary senior approval and the payble-throught 
                                                












4.2 Legal Arrangements – Access to beneficial ownership and control 
information (Recommendation 34) 
 
Recommendation 34 (2006) 
 
The recommendation in question says that countries should provide to the legal 
authorities the information on time and guarantee that the same is appropriated and 
precise. In the Portuguese case, and according to the FATF evaluation, the law is PC 
with this recommendation. This rating is justified by the limited power that the 
authorities have in what concerns the “timely access to information on the beneficial 
ownership and control of trusts”35. 
 
The Portuguese legal system doesn’t recognize the legal concept of trust, but there is 
an exception that is applied in the Madeira Free Trade zone. In this case the 
international trusts (which one is subject to a foreign law) can be legally accepted and 
the AML regime is applied. However, the truly extension to which those norms are 
applied to these arrangements was not available in first hand to the evaluation team 
and the nature of their economic activity was not well defined. This situation 
conducted to a non-positive evaluation regarding the information access of this type 
of arrangement.  
  
Recommendation 34 (2008) 
 
The Law no. 25/2008 introduced some important clarifications in the trusts regime, 
namely in what concerns measures specially develop for trusts regarding the 
                                                
35 FATF- Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Terrorism  
Financing, Portugal 2006 
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obligation to identify customers and the beneficial owner of the international trust 
(Article 7 (4) of the Law no. 25/2008). This new law guarantees that the competent 
authorities (Conservador of the Commercial Register and Judiciary Authorities) have, 
as stated in recommendation 34, timely access to information on the beneficial 
ownership and control of trusts. 
 
There were no significant differences in the number of registered foreign trusts in 
2010 and Portugal is now compliant with this recommendation. 
 






4.3 Preventive Measures – Designated Non-Financial Business and 
Professions 
 
Customer Due Diligence and Record-Keeping (Recommendation 12) 




The Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) - casinos, real 
estate agents/auctioneers, precious metals and stones dealers, lawyers, solicitadores 
and accountants - are also object of the CDD and record-keeping established in 
Recommendations 5, 6, and 8 to 11. However, according to the FATF mutual 
evaluation (2006), Portugal is PC with recommendation 12. 
 
This rating is justified by the lack of adjustment of the recommendations 5, 6, 8, 10 
and 11, because in the Portuguese law there is no appropriate/specific legislation 
respecting CDD measures (which varies, in a risk perspective approach, according to 
the type of customer, business relationship or transaction) concerning DNFBPs. 
 
Another point mentioned by the FATF is related with the fact that the subject of PEPs 
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on the case of DNFBPs entities in not clearly addressed due to the lack of specific 
AML/CTF measures focused in that particular case. 
 
The regulation concerning non-face to face relationships (Article 3.4 and Article 6 of 
Law 11/2004) establishes the obligation to proceed with the identification and 
examination of all operations that may have a higher risk of ML, but the DNFBPs 
don’t have any specific policy to act in situations of misuse of technological 
developments (Recommendation 8). 
 
According to the FATF the obligations of DNFBPs are not well defined and the 
Portuguese legislation should clarify it and include aspects related with the CDD on 
existing customers. 
 
Finally, Portugal should make an effort in order to improve the adoption and 
monitoring of FATF recommendations by DNFBPs, this recommendation was made 
due to the low number of STR reports.  
 
Recommendation 5 (2008-2010) 
 
The introduction of Law no. 25/2008 reinforced the obligation of DNFBPs to comply 
with all the measures to prevent ML and TF (“customer identification and verification 
requirements, the duty to refuse carrying out suspicious transactions in certain legal 
conditions, to keep documents and records, to scrutiny the operations, to report 
suspicious operations to the Financial Intelligence Unit and to the Attorney-General, 
to cooperate with the competent authorities, to maintain secrecy in relation to the 
customer on the reports they have made, to have internal control mechanisms to 
comply with the AML/CFT Law and to train their staff to be able to comply with the 
legal preventive duties to avoid Money Laundering and terrorist financing”36). 
 
In this new regulation the DNFBPs are obliged to considered the level of risk, of ML 
or TF involved, when they are proceeding to the identification of the beneficial 
owner. The new regime applicable to DNFBPs is in compliance with recommendation 
                                                
36 Portugal - FATF Second Update Report (2010). 
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Costumer due diligence and record keeping 
C 
 
Recommendation 6 (2008-2010) 
 
The Article 12 (4) of Law no. 25/2008 clarifies which are the legal obligations that 
DNFBPs have in a business relation with PEPs - a) that DNFBPS have systems in 
place to determine whether the customer is a PEP b) senior management approval to 
establish a business relationship with a PEP, c) take measures to establish the source 
of wealth of funds that are involved in the business relationship with a PEP37. 
 
Regarding to the approval of the mentioned law applicable to DNFBPs Portugal is in 




Costumer due diligence and record keeping 
C 
 
Recommendation 8 (2008-2010) 
 
The non face-to-face relationships can raise problems concerning customer 
identification (due to the use of new technology is easier to stay anonymous) and this 
has distinct impacts that vary depending on the DNFBPs business. 
 
Is defined, by the Law no. 25/2008, a specific due diligence to be used in this type of 
business relationship as well as extra procedures that aim to guarantee the identity of 
the customer and/or their representative. 
 
The non-face-to-face relationships have characteristics that favor Money Laundering 
or terrorism financing. It’s important to have in mind the risks associated with that 
                                                
37 Portugal- First Update Report (2008). 
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type of crime. According to Article 15 of the mentioned Law, there should be given 
special attention to the means of payments and the type of products or transactions of 
these relationships. 
 
Regarding to the Portuguese adopted measures is stated that the legal framework is 




Costumer due diligence and record keeping 
C 
 
In order to create a greater awareness, concerning AML/CTF regime, DNFBPs 
supervision authorities published a series of guidelines where the preventive duties of 
the entities supervised by them are explained. It is also important mentioning that an 
investment in training is being held38. 
 
The FIU and the Attorney General receive the STRs reported by all DNFBPs and 
these entities are compliant with this obligation.  
 
Having in mind, the measures adopted, the compliance of DNFBPs with 
recommendation 12 was guaranteed. 
 
 2006 2008-2010 
Recommendation 12 





4.4 Suspicious Transaction Reporting (Recommendation 16)  
(Applying R.13 to 15 & 21)  
 
                                                
38 Training is crucial for a successful prevention of ML and TF. In order to be aware about trends  
related with these two crimes and know the best practices concerning AML/CTF it is crucial to have 
a constant update supported by the most adequate training. (KPMG, 2010) 
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Recommendation 16 (2006) 
 
According to the FATF 2006 evaluation Portugal is PC with recommendation 16. 
Among other aspects, this classification is justified by the low number of suspicious 
transactions transmitted by DNFBPs or the competent supervisory authorities 
(between 2003 to 2005 only 10 STRs were received). However, is important to 
mention that lawyers and solicitadores are obliged to report any suspicious 
transactions according to recommendation 16, but this was a recent duty at the time of 
this evaluation (it was establish on Law 11/2004 in March 2004). 
 
Another point mention is related with the lack of co-operation between the Bar 
Association and the Chamber of Solicitadores (lawyers and solicitadores should 
report STRs to those entities) and the DCIAP or FIU. No STRs have been reported by 
this mechanism since this requirement was approved which is also comproved by the 
UIF 2006 report in which is provided with detail the number of STRs by the various 
entities (See Annex 3). 
 
Recommendation 16 (2008-2010) 
 
In order to give an appropriate answer to the lack of co-operation problem mentioned 
before, the Article 35 of the AML Law defines the enhancement of the duty of 
reporting STRs that the Bar Association and the Chamber of Solicitadores have to the 
FIU and the Attorney General of the Republic.  
 
Law no.25/2008 was an important regulation that was used to clarify the functions of 
Lawyers and Solicitadores in order to ensure their compliance with AML/CTF Law. 
 
Applying Recommendation 15 (2006) 
 
Regarding the training in areas related with AML/CTF measures this is not enough 
(casinos are an exception to this evaluation in which there are programs in order to 
improve the AML awareness). 
 
Article 11 of Law 11/2004 addresses the DNFBPs obligations regarding the STR 
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reporting and training that these entities should give to their staff allowing them to 
recognize transactions involving ML. At the time of the evaluation in analyzes, none 
training or guideline was given to the DNFB sector, lawyers and solicitadores.  
However, ASAE was created with the objective of establishing preventive measures 
from that point on and to provide training. 
 
Recommendation 15 - Training provided to DNFBPs (2008-2010) 
 
A series of initiatives were taken in order to clarify the DNFBPs about their 
obligations concerning communication of suspicious activities and at the same time 
increasing its compliance. 
 
Now due to the seminars offered about AML/CTF, Solicitadores are finally aware 
about their duties in this field and the same happened with other entities (like lawyers 
and accountants that since 2006 started to comply with their duty of communicate to 
the authorities the STRs). 
 
Applying Recommendation 21 (2006) 
 
An aspect that contributes to the present rating, is the non-obligation of DNFBPs to 
analyze carefully and report the truly nature/origin of transactions involving countries 
that don’t put in practice the FATF recommendations. 
 
Regarding Recommendations 15 and 21 in respect of DNFBPs, significant 
improvements are required for them to reach FATF standards. 
 
Recommendation 21 - Warnings related to non-cooperative countries or 
jurisdictions (2008-2010) 
 
The countries that don´t properly apply the FATF 40 recommendations are also 
subject to the Article 42 of Law no. 25/2008 according to which the supervisory 
authorities should provide notifications in order to prevent ML and TF. The DNFBPs 
with the mentioned notifications reinforced the due dillegence in operations involving 
non-cooperative countries in ML and TF. 
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As already mentioned in the previous points several improvements and initiatives 
were done and at this point due to them Portugal can be considered compliant with the 
Recommendation 16. 
 
 2006 2008-2010 
Recommendation 12 
DNFBP – R.5, 6, 8-11 
PC C 
 
4.5 Regulation, Supervision and Monitoring (Recommendation 24 & 25) 
 
Portugal was considered PC with recommendation 24 and 25. 
 
Recommendation 24 (2006) 
 
In order to guarantee the compliance of DNFBPs entities (Casinos; Real estate 
agencies, buying and selling of real estate, selling of precious stones and metals; 
Registers and Notaries; Lawyer; Solicitadores) with the norms concerning AML/CTF 
a set of SRO (Self-Regulatory Organizations) and government authorities should 
verify their degree of application of the AML Law. However, only the competent 
authorities responsible for the supervision and monitoring of casinos and Real estate 
(IGJ and IGAE/ASAE respectively) complied with their functions (See Annex 3) 
(communicating 4,058 STRs to the FIU between 2002 and 2005) and this fact is used 
as one of this justification for the present rating. 
 
Recommendation 24 (2008-2010) 
 
Between 2008 and 2010 Portugal adopted a series of measures in order to answer to 
the FATF recommendations about what the country should do to be compliant with 
recommendation 24. 
According to the FATF Portugal should bet in creating a bigger DNFBPs awareness 
around the AML/CTF preventive system and should guarantee that the measures are 
adopted and efficient.  
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The SROs saw, in the Articles 38 and 39 of Law no. 25/2008, their powers defined 
and clarified (new regulations could appear in the future). One of the reasons 
previously mentioned by the FATF for the non-compliance with Recommendation 24 
was the fact that when necessary to proceed with a supervision, the SROs didn’t have 
enough means to perform it. 
 
To create a bigger awareness and knowledge around the preventive system several 
entities (like for instance The Bar Association and the Chamber of Solicitadores) used 
their website information about AML/CTF. 
 
In order to ensure that the AML is adopted in an efficient way, ASAE performed a 
significant number of inspections (119 in 2009 and in the first semester of 2010). 
 
 2006 2008-2010 
Recommendation 24 





Recommendation 25 (2006) 
 
According to recommendation 25 the DNFBPs should receive support from the 
competent authorities (supervisor or SRO) in fields related with ML and TF (namely 
in the implementation of their preventive norms and detection of suspicious 
operations), but at the time of the mutual evaluation (2006) this orientation was not 
enough (IGAE/ASAE and casinos were an exception). 
 
 
Recommendation 25 (2008-2010) 
 
One of the recommendations given by the FATF regarding recommendation 25 
concerns feedback that should be “more specific, timely and systematic”. 
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Thanks to the law no.25/2008 the FIU is obliged to give feedback to the entities to 
which this law is applicable about the suspicious transactions reported. 
 
Another point included in this new law is the emission (by supervision authorities) of 
warnings and trends in ML and due to this the answer to ML threats can be more 
effective. 
 
Under this recommendation and respecting the Law no.25/2008 a series of guidelines 
were launched by DNFBPs oversight authorities with the aim to provide guidance 
about compliance to the AML system to the subject entities. 
 
 2006 2008-2010 
Recommendation 25 
Guidelines & Feedback 
PC C 
 
4.6 Legal Persons and Arrangements & Non-Profit Organizations 
 
Legal Persons – Access to beneficial ownership and control information 
(Recommendation 33) 
 
Recommendation 33 (2006) 
 
According to the FATF Recommendation 33 there are a set of measures that countries 
should adopt regarding Legal Persons39 that should include the prevention of an 
armful and illegal use of these entities (especially when the same can issue bearer 
shares) by Money Launderers. The information about the beneficial ownership40 and 
control of legal persons should be provided on time to the authorities. 
                                                
39 “bodies corporate, foundations, anstalt, partnerships, or associations, or any similar bodies that can  
establish a permanent customer relationship with a financial institution or otherwise own property” 
(http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/glossary/0,3414,en_32250379_32236930_35433764_1_1_1_1,00.html#34285832) 
40 “the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the person on whose  
behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also incorporates those persons who exercise ultimate 




According to recommendation 5, countries should implement measures that guarantee 
that financial institutions have access to information concerning beneficial ownership 
and control information. 
 
Portugal was considered PC with the recommendation above mentioned. 
In the National Register of Legal Persons (RNPC) and also in the Commercial 
Register is possible to find the register of diverse kinds of companies (general 
partnerships, limited liability companies, joint-stock companies, limited partnerships 
and partnerships limited by shares) that have businesses in Portugal. The data 
available in the RNPC and in the commercial register is public. However, the entity of 
the beneficial owner (that can have power over the legal person) is not available 




In what concerns Bearer Shares41 there’s no need to registered the transference of 
ownership of this financial instrument. 
 
In commercial companies, not issuing bearer shares of a non public company, the 
partners are identified and list in the commercial register and there’s an obligation to 
proceed with the registration of movements of the company shares.   
 
However, when an issue of bearer shares occurs in a non public company the 
registration procedure is not the same. In this case, a shareholder (that has more than 
10% of voting rights) has to be identified in order to get dividends (banks and 
financial institutions have to get and document this information and due to this 
obligation the risk associated with the used of bearer shares as a vehicle for ML 
decreases) but there is always the possibility that they don’t want to exercise their 
rights and don’t provide their identification at the shareholders meeting  (which 
conduct to a non transparent situation concerning the company’s control that is 
                                                
41 “Bearer shares refers to negotiable instruments that accord ownership in a corporation to the person  




contrary to the recommendation in analysis according to which the information about 
the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons should be provided on time to 
the authorities). 
 
Recommendation 33 (2008-2010) 
 
In order to give an appropriate answer to the failures in compliance with 
recommendation 33 Portugal adopted a series of measures. 
 
The entity of the beneficial owners is contained in the Commercial Register and 
anyone, including the public authorities, can have access to the same.  
 
Now a shareholder with more than 10% of the company’s shares have to provide 
information to the Commercial Register when bearer shares are issued (even when the 
company in analyses is public). 
 
Due to the publication of Law no.25/2008 the beneficial owner of legal person needs 
to be identified and verified (according to the level of risk associated with the 
operation) no matter if the shares are nominative or bearer. 
 
Despite the presented information is considered enough and appropriate for 
preventing Money Laundering and terrorism financing, one should not forget that 
efforts to strengthen this struggle are expected to be made easier by the enactment in 
the near future of a bill, which will abolish bearer shares and promote the conversion 
to nominal shares in a timeframe of 5 years from its enactment. Concluding, with the 
actual measures Portugal can be considered LC (largely compliant) with this 
recommendation.  
 
 2006 2008-2010 
Recommendation 33 






4.7 Statistics (Recommendation 32)  
 
According to Recommendation 32 statistics are fundamental material that help a 
country to monitor the efficiency and effectiveness of their ML system. Portugal was 
considered PC with this recommendation. 
 
The FATF gave in their 2006 evaluation report some recommendations about areas in 
which Portugal should improve and get more data about: 
 
• Number of ML/TF investigations, prosecutions and convictions 
 
• Number of cases and the amounts of property frozen, seized and confiscated 
relating to ML, TF and criminal proceeds 
 
• Statistics on whether the request for mutual legal assistance was granted or 
refused and on how much time was required to respond 
 
• Number of requests for extradition for ML/TF cases and figures on whether the 
request was granted or refused and how much time was required to respond 
 
• Number of spontaneous referrals made by the FIU to foreign authorities 
 
Recommendation 32 (2008) 
 
The statistical data related with justice is responsibility of the General Directorate for 
Justice Policy (DGPJ) and the Ministry of Justice, and in order to give an appropriate 
answer to the FATF recommendation and recognizing the importance, for the ML 
combat, of this data collection the Portuguese Statistics Information System was 
improved.  
The Law no.25/2008, addressing AML/CTF issues, introduced some important points 
in what concerns collection of data for statistics purposes and it’s previous 
publication. Some entities were binding by this law namely the FIU (that should 
publish statistics about STR and their results), the judicial and law enforcement 
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authorities (that should provide to the General Directorate for Justice Policy 
information about ML and TF) and the General Directorate for Justice Policy (should 
make known the statistics about the ML and TF preventive system). 
 
 A total of 225 enquiries related with ML and TF were done between 2006 and 2008, 
which represent an increase when comparing with previous years and the number of 
convictions also increased which represents an important indicator about the 
efficiency of the system (See Annex 4). The investigations carried out conducted to 
several confiscations of goods from ML activities were made by the state (See Annex 
5). The majority of convictions in Portugal (between 2006 and first semester of 2008) 
are related with drug trafficking (55%) and corruption, swindling and prostitution 
(15%).  
 
The suspicious transactions have also seen the number of reports increased (See 
Annex 6). Analyzing Annex 6 (Reports receiving by the FIU) is possible to see that 
the number of declarations made to customs authorities decrease significantly in 2008 
when comparing with the previous year and this can mean that the numbers 
concerning 2007 can be overcome and at the same time the declaration system suffer 
improvements. 
 
The numbers concerning Suspension of executions and frozen amounts also increased 
comparing to 2005 (See Annex 7). 
 
Despite of all the improvements done, until 2008, the statistics studies had fails and 
much more needed to be done. Analyzing the FATF´s recommendations for Portugal 
and comparing the same with the results presented there some differences between the 
data presented in the FATF update report and the UIF Annual Report (2006 and 
2007). This discrepancy is noted mainly in the number of total CTR received by the 
UIF in 2006 and 2007 (as can be seen in Annex 6 and Annex 8). However analyzing 
the numbers presented for 2008 (in the UIF report for 2008 and in the second FATF 
update report (2010)) these ones are the same in both reports. 
 
Having in mind the suggestions made by the FATF in order to improve the statistical 
framework there are points, which are not respected. 
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Concerning the exchange of information between the various FIU´s there is only data 
about the number of requests received and sent, but there is no data about the time 
that it takes to give/receive an answer; if the request is refused or not and the number 
of spontaneous referrals is also unknown (See Annex 16 and 17). Another point 
mentioned by the FATF as one that should be included in the statistics is the number 
of requests for extraditions and the same is not provided. 
 
Incoherent numbers are presented concerning the number of suspensions (See Annex 
7 and 9) as well as the amounts frozen and confiscations which ones don’t correspond 
(for instance according to the UIF Annual Report (2006) the amounts confiscated 
were: EUR 22.086.457; USD 250.000. However in the FATF update report (2008) the 
value presented for 2006 is around EUR 21.667.942, which is translated into a 
difference of EUR 408.515). In what concerns the last point mentioned is important to 
note that in the FATF first update report is made reference to some assets (like 
automobiles and one apartment) that can justify the difference found, but this 
misunderstanding can be avoid and clarified if a more standardize process was 
adopted (which and the same time transmits a more accurate information). 
 
Recommendation 32 (2010) 
 
Since 2007 have been included in the statistical data all accusations and convictions, 
in spite of ML being the most serious crime in the criminal register (what didn’t 
happen before). This new measure contributes for more precise information about ML 
crimes. In this new update report is possible to identify criminal enquiries that 
incorporate ML offence still when this one is not the main register in the criminal file 
or when it appears in the middle of the investigation (See Annex 10). The number of 
enquiries and convictions when comparing with 2007 increased significantly (See 
Annex 10 and 4 respectively) which can represent a greater commitment in the fight 
and prevention of ML crimes. The amount of funds and assets frozen also augmented 
(see Annex 11). 
 
The principal predicate offense for ML, in Portugal, is still related with drugs 
trafficking followed by cyber fraud, tax fraud and corruption (See Annex 12). 
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However, is important to highlight the tremendous decrease in the number of drugs 
trafficking crimes (from 64 crimes in 2008 to 39 in 2009). 
 
A larger number of suspicious operations were reported to the FIU (between 2008 and 
the 1st quarter of 2010), which shows a bigger efficiency of the AML system and a 
bigger compliance of several entities with their reporting duty (See Annex 13). The 
DGAIEC has taken a more active role in monitoring the declarations of cash at the 
borders (See Annex 14 and 15) and this is illustrated in an increase in the declarations 
of currency above € 10 000. 
 
Some improvements were done since the last update report (2008) namely in what 
concerns the number of transactions reported that are the same in the UIF´s annual 
report (2008, 2009 and 2010) and the update report under review. The number of 
predicate offences is also known which gives a more precise idea about the dimension 
and activities related with this type of crime. However, many fails already mentioned 
before continue to exist. 
 
 2006 2008-2010 
Recommendation 32 





The Portuguese legal framework to combat ML crimes is in general well designed and 
respects the majority of the recommendations provide by the FATF. 
 
The preventive side is under the scope of the Law no.25/2008. This relatively recent 
legislation introduced some major changes and it was extremely important, because 
due to its implementation Portugal was able to correct, in its AML system, some 
major points that conducted to a non-positive evaluation (NC or PC) concerning some 
FATF recommendations. However, it’s important to highlight that this law is recent 
and its important to analyze in the long run the real effects and improvements that will 
occur. 
 
The DNFBPs saw their obligations clarified in the new legislation and this fact was 
crucial for the their compliance with the AML framework (in the previous law some 
of the major fails were related with these entities) and in practical terms is visible 
namely in the increasing numbers of STRs reported by the DNFBPs (which was one 
of the main points referred by the FATF in its evaluation from Portugal (2006)). In 
general terms, and not only in the DNFBPs case, the STRs increase significantly with 
reflect a bigger awareness and commitment from the several entities and this 
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Source: The Egmont Group – Information Paper. 
 
 
LWG - Is responsible for the selection of future members and deals with all that as to 
do with legal aspects . 
OWG - Establish a global network of FIUs. 
TWG - Provides training to the Egmont members. 
OpWG - Develops the different typologies of FIUs and is also responsible for the 
strategic projects. 
ITWG - Guarantees the necessary technical assistance. 
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Annex 3 - STRs and CTRs received by sector (2003-2005) 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 STR CTR Total STR CTR Total STR CTR Total 
Credit 
Institutions 182  182 315  315 317  317 
Central Bank     61 61  191 191 
Insurance       3  3 
CMVM        31 31 
Bureaux de 
Change          
















 50 50  78 78  358 358 
ASAE        4058 4058 
Betting and 
Lotteries        2 2 
Others  150 150  46 46 10 1 11 






Annex 4 - ML Enquiries, Accusations and Convictions in the period of 2006 to 
2008 (first semester) 
 
 2006 2007 2008 (First Semester) Total 
Enquiries 84 95 46 225 
Accused persons 12 25 16 53 























Source: FATF, first update report Portugal (2008) 
 
 
Annex 5  - Confiscations in the period 2006-2008 
 
2006 2007 2008 (First Semester) 









Gold manufactured  
One apartment 











Gold manufactured objects 
 




Annex 6 - Reports received by the FIU 
 
 2006 2007 2008 (First Semester) 
 STR CTR Total STR CTR Total STR CTR Total 
Credit 
Institutions 507 39 546 588 156 744 253 86 339 
Central Bank 35 172 207 54 114 168 12 53 65 
Insurance  16 16 11 2 13  23 23 
CMVM  54 54       
Bureaux de 
Change 31 1 32 66 45 111 10 6 16 
















1 180 181  820 820  466 466 
ASAE  2 2  1 1    
Betting and 
Lotteries 1 3 4 5  5    
Chartered 
Accountants  1 1 1 1 2    
Others 7 12 19 8  8 2  2 
Total 584 15 651 16 235 724 12 577 13 301 277 18 480 18 757 
 
 
Source: FATF, first update report Portugal (2008) 
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Annex 7 - Suspensions of executions and amounts frozen 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 (First Trimester) 
Number 4 17 13 6 
Amounts 
EUR 3 236 262 EUR 11 295 000 
 
£ 154 000 
 
USD 1 670 000 
EUR 14 950 000 
 
USD 250 000 
EUR 8 556 000 
 
Source: FATF, first update report Portugal (2008) 
 
 
Annex 8 - Reports received by the FIU 
 


















4 15 602 8 11 923 4 21 851 
Others 7 12 7  7 1 
Total 584 15 896 724 12 250 568 22 165 
 
Sources: UIF Annual report 200;UIF Annual report 2007;UIF Annual report 2008. 
 
 
Annex 9 - Suspensions (2006 and 2007) 
 
 2006 2007 
Number of cases 15 14 
Amounts 
EUR 22 086 457 
 
USD 250 000 
EUR 15 523 476, 03 
 
£ 330 000, 00 
 
USD 24 631 570, 47 
 




Annex 10 - ML Enquiries, Accusations and Convictions in the period of 2008 to 
2010 (first semester) 
 
 2008 2009 
2010 (First 
Semester) 
Enquiries 200 154 64 
Enquiries above referred 
with accusations 
30 17 NA 
Convictions 16 14 NA 
 
Source: FATF, second update report Portugal (2010). 
 
 
Annex 11- Amounts frozen in the period of 2008 to 2010 (first semester) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 (first semester) 
Number of cases 18 15 14 
Amounts frozen EUR 1 429 000 
 
USD 12 000 000 
EUR 14 700 000 EUR 5 750 000 
 
USD 3 550 000 
 
Source: FATF, second update report Portugal (2010). 
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Annex 12 - Predicate offences related to ML enquiries from 2008 to 2010 (first 
semester) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 (First sem.) Total 
Drugs 
Trafficking  64 39 5 108 
Cyber Fraud 22 21 10 53 
Tax Fraud 15 14 16 45 
Corruption  21 10 2 33 
Fraud 2 7 6 15 
Robbery 7 5  12 
Arms 
Trafficking 2 6  8 
Kidnapping  2 3 1 6 
Extortion 2 1 1 4 
Counterfeiting 
of currency 1 3  4 
Child Abuse  2 1 3 
Document 
forgery  3  3 
Organized 





60 39 22 121 
Total 200 154 64 418 
 
Source: FATF, second update report Portugal (2010). 
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Annex 13 - Reports received by the FIU between 2008 and 2010 (first semester) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 (First Semester) 
 STR CTR Total STR CTR Total STR CTR Total 
Credit 
Institutions 508 163 671 546 207 753 163 60 223 
Central Bank 28 118 146 27 69 96 8 16 24 
Insurance 3 25 28 2  2    
CMVM 1  1 3  3    
Bureaux de 
Change 17 7 24 18 18 36 8 13 21 
















 698 698  1 390 1 390    
Betting and 
Lotteries 2  2 3 7 10    
Real Estate 1  1       
Postal 
Services    21 17 38 8 9 17 
Others 7 1 8 11 5 16    
Total 568 22 165 22 733 634 14 565 15 199 187 1 858 2 045 
 








 Reports Received (2010) 
Supervision and Financial Entities 2.282 




Source: UIF Annual Report 2010. 
 
 
Annex 14- Declarations of cash at the borders from 2008 to 2010 (first quarter) 
 
2008 2009 2010 (First Quarter) Total 
1331 1878 733 3942 
 
Source: FATF, second update report Portugal (2010). 
 
 
Annex 15 - Seizure of currency by Portuguese Customs from 2008 to 2010 (first 
quarter) 
 
2008 2009 2010 (First Quarter) 
14 76 13 
EUR 487 433 
 
USD 60 000 
EUR 3 838 523 
 
£ 4 175 
 
USD 524 782 
 
ZAR 2 370 
EUR 259 750 
 
USD 323 365 
 






Annex 16- Exchange of information – FIU´s (Number of requests) 
 
 Received Sent 
2006  91 297 
2007  104 260 
 
Source: UIF Annual Report 2006; UIF Annual Report 2007. 
 
Annex 17 - Exchange of information – FIU´s (Number of requests) 
 
2008 2009 2010 (First Quarter) 
Received Sent Received Sent Received Sent 
94 183 104 91 29 18 
 
Source: FATF, second update report Portugal (2010) 
